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When the second becomes 
number one: vice-presidential 
power in foreign and defense 
policy in the twenty-first century
Christopher Griffin
It is somewhat misleading to refer to the US Vice President as the 
“sidekick” of the President, as that was never the purpose of the position. The 
Vice President was never intended to be the closest advisor to the president. 
The position has always been much further down the chain of command. 
John Adams, the first Vice President, called it “the most insignificant office 
that ever the invention of man contrived,”1 and it was initially a sort of conso-
lation prize for the runner-up in presidential elections. The Vice President was 
not considered as part of the executive branch until the twentieth century, 
as the position as the President of the Senate was considered to be a legisla-
tive branch responsibility.2 Vice Presidents were not allowed even to sit in on 
cabinet meetings until 1921.3 
It was a surprise, therefore, to read headlines such as “Is this the real pres-
ident of the United States?,” with a photo of the Vice President in the Guardian 
in July 2007.4 An entire literature exists that claims that Richard Cheney was 
in fact the real president during the George W. Bush administration.5 It is 
clear that Cheney was the most powerful Vice President to date, and that he 
wielded considerable influence in the Bush administration. A key example, 
albeit in particular circumstances, was Cheney’s order to the military to shoot 
1 Cited in Goldstein, Joel K., “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 38 (2008): p. 374.
2 Relyea, Harold C., “The Law: The Executive Office of the Vice President: Constitutional and 
Legal Considerations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 40 (2010): p. 328.
3 Albert, Richard, “The Evolving Vice Presidency,” Temple Law Review 78 (2005): p. 832.
4 Pilkington (Ed.), “Is this the real president of the United States?,” Guardian, 23 Jul. 2007.
5 See for example: Nichols, John, Dick: The Man Who Is President (New York: The New Press, 
2004), Goldsmith,  Jack, “How Cheney Reined in Presidential Power,” New  York  Times, 
15 Sep. 2011, Kattner, Robert, “Cheney’s Unprecedented Power,” Boston Globe, 25 Feb. 2009, 
Warshaw, Shirley Anne, The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009).
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down civilian airliners heading for Washington on 11  September  2001.6 
This was clearly an order that fell outside vice-presidential authority. In an 
influential article in the New  York  Times in 2003, Elisabeth  Bumiller and 
Eric Schmitt argued that Cheney’s extraordinary power was concentrated in 
three policy areas: national security, homeland defense, and the economy.7
This paper will focus in on the first policy area, national security, and 
examine two related questions. First, how did Cheney become such a powerful 
leader in foreign and defense policy? Second, how did his power in this issue 
area evolve during his vice-presidency? This paper argues that Cheney’s leader-
ship in foreign and defense policy was not at odds with President Bush, who 
indeed likely facilitated Cheney’s rise. I also put forth the proposition that 
a relatively unexplored reason for Cheney’s power in national security was 
his close relationship with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.8 The duo 
Cheney-Rumsfeld were able to put considerable pressure on the rest of the 
Bush’s decision-making team to impose their particular worldview, especially 
regarding the decision to go to war in Iraq and on issues of counter-terro-
rism. When Rumsfeld left office in 2006, Cheney’s influence appears to have 
declined to a certain degree, which indicates that the Secretary of Defense was 
at least in part important for vice-presidential power. 
This paper will first briefly address the well-known changes in the vice-
presidency that led to increased power in the position since 1945, which 
provided a precedent for Cheney’s influence in the Bush administration. The 
paper will then examine the issue areas where Cheney appears to have had 
decisive impact, most notably the war in Iraq and counter-terrorism policy, 
and his relationship with Rumsfeld. Finally, the paper will consider what we 
know about Cheney’s influence in the Bush administration after 2006.
Vice Presidential Power since 1945
A common starting point to discuss the rise of vice presidential power, 
especially in national security, is with Harry Truman. Truman, on becoming 
president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, admitted to having little 
knowledge regarding the US’s military strategy in World War  II, and had 
not been informed about the Manhattan Project.9 After becoming president, 
6 Cheney,  Dick and Cheney,  Liz, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New  York: 
Threshold Editions, 2011): p. 3.
7 Bumiller, Elisabeth and Schmitt, Eric, “Cheney, Little Seen By Public, Plays a Visible Role for 
Bush,” New York Times, 31 Jan. 2003.
8 See also the documentary film The Unknown Known: The Life and Times of Donald Rumsfeld, 
2013, which is a long interview with the former secretary about his life and his decisions 
during the Bush administration.
9 Kengor, Paul, “The Vice President, Secretary of State, and Foreign Policy,” Political Science 
Quarterly 115 (2000): p. 175.
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Truman attempted to partially remedy the situation by appointing his own 
Vice President to a position on the new National Security Council (NSC) in 
1949. Truman wanted to give the Vice President an idea of what was going on 
in the national security arena should he be called to take over the leadership of 
the country.10 It was clearly necessary to have a ready and informed successor 
available in case the president was killed in a surprise nuclear attack.11
What is important to note, and would later also be crucial for the rise of 
Cheney’s influence, was that vice presidential power increased at the same 
time as that of the president. According to historian Joel Goldsmith, there 
were three major changes that provided the Vice President with more power 
in the 1960s and 1970s. First, Richard  Nixon decided that the the Vice 
President needed more responsibility in foreign policy.12 This change should 
be taken with a grain of salt, however, as any Vice President, no matter how 
powerful, would have been overshadowed in the realm of national security 
by Henry Kissinger, who combined the office of National Security Advisor 
and Secretary of State. Second, the Vice President became a real contender 
for the presidency.13 Senator and 2008 presidential candidate John McCain, 
however, claimed in 2004 that the vice presidency was a waste of time, and 
compared it to his experiences in a North Vietnamese prison camp.14 Third, 
President Jimmy  Carter became the first president to delegate significant 
powers to his Vice President, Walter Mondale, and made a number of struc-
tural changes that effectively made Mondale a primary advisor and part of the 
executive branch.15 Mondale’s Chief of Staff, Richard Moe, stated that “Carter 
put Mondale in the chain of command,” where he had some responsibilities 
in the field of national security, including renewing relations with Vietnam in 
the aftermath of the war.16
Vice presidential influence in foreign policy was not completely unpre-
cedented, even if the extent of Cheney’s power surpassed that of all of his 
successors. George H.W. Bush was given the job of investigating US efforts to 
combat terrorism in 1986 after attacks by Libya in Europe.17 Vice Presidents 
10 Relyea p. 329.
11 This would seem to have been Truman’s initiative (or irritation at having been kept out of the 
loop), as danger to the president through assassination was nothing new. 
12 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency”, p. 376.
13 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency”, p. 376.
14 Sandalaw,  Marc, “Golden Age of the Second Banana/US Vice Presidency Rises from 
Anonymity to Become One of World’s Most Powerful Jobs,” SF Gate, 4 Jul. 2004.
15 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency” p. 377-378.
16 Moe, Richard, “The Making of the Modern Vice Presidency. A Personal Reflection,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 38 (2008): 398.
17 Ronald Reagan, “The National Program for Combating Terrorism,” National Security Decision 
Directive Number 207, National Security Archive, September 11 Sourcebooks, Vol. I, 20 Jan. 
1986.
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Dan  Quayle and Al  Gore also wielded increased power in foreign policy. 
Paul Kengor claims that Quayle’s influence was reduced due to his rocky rela-
tionship with Secretary of State James Baker, despite the Vice President’s consi-
derable expertise in national security issues.18 Cheney, however, manifested 
considerable respect for Quayle while the former was Secretary of Defense.19 
Kengor also argues that Gore’s increased foreign policy power came in part 
due to his close relationship with Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and 
Madeleine Albright, who allowed Gore to influence Russian policy.20
Roy  Brownell points out the extent to which the position of the Vice 
President is independent. As the Vice President is technically elected by the 
public, he or she cannot be fired by the President, and thus can take positions 
or actions opposed to the administration.21 Brownell demonstrates that Vice 
Presidents, unlike the popular perception, have frequently defied their recep-
tive Presidents throughout American history. Cheney opposed Bush on four 
occasions: the weapons inspectors in Iraq, gay marriage, Senate rules on the 
filibuster, and litigation on the Second mendment of the Constitution.22 Thus, 
the Vice President is not always relegated to a sidekick position, and has a great 
deal of protection against sanctions coming from the executive branch.23
Vice President Cheney and National Security
The power of the executive branch in foreign policy is one that has stimu-
lated considerable debate. One of the problems is the contention over the 
term “Commander in Chief,” which many Presidents have taken to mean that 
the executive can make most major decisions regarding war and diplomacy.24 
While most scholars argue that the President does not in fact have full power 
over the formulation of foreign policy, it is clear that the Bush administration 
gained considerable powers in the area through Congressional authorizations 
for the use of force in 2001 and 2002.25 Congress gave Bush the power to fight 




21 Brownell, Roy E., “The Independence of the Vice Presidency,” Legislation and Public Policy 17 
(2014): p. 302-306.
22 Brownell, “The Independence of the Vice Presidency” p. 355-356.
23 The only way to remove a Vice President is through impeachment .
24 Adler, David Grey, “George W. Bush as Commander in Chief: Toward the Nether World of 
Constitutionalism,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (2006): p. 530.
25 Rudalevige, Andrew, “The Decline (and Resurgence) of Congress: Charting a New Imperial 
Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (2006): p.  511-512. See also Whittington, 
Keith E. and Daniel P. Carpenter, “Executive Power in American Institutional Development,” 
Perspectives in Politics 1 (2003): p. 495-513.
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coupled with a general reluctance of Congress to oppose the White House on 
national security.26
One might think that Bush would have kept that power for himself, 
instead of delegating it to his sidekick. For reasons outlined in further detail 
below, however, the President was willing to delegate many national security 
responsibilities to Cheney. Bush gave Cheney powers in other, domestic policy 
areas as well, but the expansion of national security powers in such areas as 
surveillance and the fight against weapons of mass destruction meant that 
delegation was necessary.27 There was also a legal precedent. As Vice President 
in 1961, Lyndon B. Johnson asked the Assistant Attorney General to study the 
powers of the Vice President in the executive branch. The surprising answer 
is that it is the President’s decision on how much power to delegate, but that 
the Vice President has much more legitimacy in foreign affairs and national 
security than in domestic politics.28
James P. Pfiffner claimed in 2009 that: “In the George W. Bush administra-
tion…national security advice to the president was dominated by Vice President 
Cheney.”29 Joel Goldstein said that Cheney was the “Chief Operating Officer” 
to President Bush’s CEO, and that “Vice President Cheney has been seen as the 
architect of virtually every significant initiative of the administration.”30 How 
did Cheney come to be such a powerful sidekick in the Bush administration?
Cheney was far from an unknown figure in Washington, despite his repu-
tation for operating in the shadows. He began his political career in 1968 as an 
American Political Science Association congressional fellow, and was initially 
rejected for a job by Donald Rumsfeld, who at the time was a congressman 
from Illinois.31 After the rejection, however, Cheney later became Rumsfeld’s 
employee and colleague, and the two men worked closely together during the 
Ford administration. Cheney became Chief of Staff when Rumsfeld gave up 
the position to become Secretary of Defense in 1975. Cheney’s career conti-
nued after Ford’s defeat, and he was elected as a Republican Representative 
from Wyoming for ten years during the 1980s. President George H.W. Bush 
then appointed Cheney as his Secretary of Defense during the Persian Gulf War. 
26 Hess,  Gary R., “Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002,” 
Political Science Quarterly 121 (2006): p. 109-110.
27 Baumgartner, Jody  C., The American Vice Presidency: From the Shadows to the Spotlight 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015): p. 163-164, 168.
28 Katzenbach, Nicolas, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Participation of 
the Vice President in the Affairs of the Executive Branch,” Memorandum Opinion for the Vice 
President, 19 Mar. 1961.
29 Pfiffner,  James  P., “The Contemporary Presidency: Decision Making in the Bush White 
House,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (2009): p. 366.
30 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency”: p. 384.
31 Cheney and Cheney: p. 41.
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Cheney’s experience in the White House and in the Pentagon was valuable 
for President George  W.  Bush, who came to the White House with little 
experience in the fields of foreign policy and national security, and delegated 
much of that authority to Cheney.32 In this sense, according to Goldstein, 
Cheney was powerful fundamentally because Bush decided it would be 
so.33 Interestingly, however, in his memoirs, President Bush says that he was 
pleased to have Cheney as Vice President, due to his “pro-life, low-tax posi-
tions [which] helped cement key parts of our base,” which were domestic 
issues.34 Cheney was clearly the sidekick of Bush, but at the same time, as we 
will see below, Bush allowed him to have so much responsibility in foreign 
policy, that Cheney effectively became the leader in the issue area.
One claim is that Cheney became so powerful because he had no ambition 
to be president, and thus was not a threat to Bush. The White House Chief 
of Staff in the first Bush term, Andrew Card, stated that: “The vice president 
is not looking to be president. Do you know how unusual that is?”35 The 
fundamental problem with this argument was that Cheney in fact did want 
to be president during the 1990s, and even began to set up a campaign for a 
run in 1996. Cheney stated in his memoirs in 2011: “The idea of serving as 
president was very appealing. I had worked in the White House or served in 
the cabinet of three presidents. And I believed I knew what it takes to make 
an effective chief executive.”36 Cheney had more ambition than is commonly 
believed, and it is very likely that Bush and other White House officials would 
have known this at the time. Cheney admits that the run for president would 
have been a “long-shot prospect” and that he was worried about his family 
and his history of heart problems.37
If Cheney thought himself unfit to become President, then how did he 
become Vice President? There is a fairly extensive literature on how the Vice 
President is selected in American politics, and recent scholarship suggests that 
it is important for Presidents to choose running mates who have a great deal 
of experience in government.38 Earlier hypotheses, which indicated that the 
Vice President was chosen for “ticket balancing,” or providing a particular 
political advantage (the electoral votes of a large state, or an alliance with 
another faction of the party), have lost significance since the election reforms 
32 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency” p. 385, Relyea p. 335-336.
33 Goldstein, “The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency” p. 386.
34 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway Books, 2011): p. 70.
35 Cited in Bumiller and Schmitt.
36 Cheney and Cheney: p. 241-242.
37 Cheney and Cheney: p. 242, 246, 254.
38 Hiller, Mark and Kriner, Douglas, “Institutional Change and the Dynamics of Vice Presidential 
Selection,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38 (2008): p. 402.
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of the early 1970s.39 The three electoral votes in the state of Wyoming make 
it improbable that Bush would have chosen Cheney to balance the ticket 
in 2000.40
There is a good deal of controversy regarding Cheney’s selection as Vice 
President. Cheney was in charge of the Bush administration’s committee to 
find a running mate in 2000, and he interviewed the other candidates himself. 
A number of commentators claim that Cheney’s intention all along was to 
appoint himself Vice President, by using his position to eliminate other conten-
ders.41 With current sources, it is not possible to make a definitive statement on 
this question, but recent scholars argue that Cheney at least made a deal with 
Bush for more power if he agreed to be Vice President.42 A detailed CNN report 
on Cheney’s selection prior to the 2000 election stated at the time that Bush 
had a great deal of trust in Cheney, which would help explain the delegation of 
extensive powers to the President’s sidekick after the election.43
A further reason for the unprecedented scope of Cheney’s power was the 
concentration of national power in the executive branch in the Bush admi-
nistration. The attempt to gain more power for the executive at the expense 
of Congress had been in the works since the 1970s after the reduction of 
presidential power following Watergate.44 Cheney was at the forefront of this 
effort prior to 2000.45 In what is perhaps the most prominent example of 
Cheney’s belief in the importance of executive power, he, as a Congressman 
in 1987, co-wrote a “Minority Report,” defending President Ronald Reagan 
against the Congressional majority in the Iran-Contra affair.46 After the 2000 
elections, Cheney even went so far as to at least indirectly claim executive 
privilege for the Vice President to keep secrets in dealing with Congress, 
which was a long way from the limited legislative role for the office envisaged 
by the Founders.47 The first attempt to work outside of Congress was Cheney’s 
39 Hiller and Kriner: p. 405.
40 Baumgartner: p. 159.
41 Fisman, David, Fisman, Raymond J., Galet, Julia, Khurana, Rakesh, and Wang, Yongxiang, 
“Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney,” B.E. Journal of Economic 
Analysis and Policy 13 (2012): p. 6.
42 Baumgartner: p. 159.
43 Carney, James and Dickerson, John F., “How Bush Decided,” CNN, 1 Aug. 2000.
44 Skowronek, Stephen, “The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental 
Perspective on the Unitary Executive,” Harvard Law Review 122 (2009): p. 2070-2103.
45 Meiers, Franz-Josef, “The Return of the Imperial Presidency? The President, Congress, and US 
Foreign Policy after 11 September 2001,” Amerikastudien/American Studies 55 (2010): p. 255.
46 For the text of this report, see United States, Cong., “Report of the Congressional Committees 
Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views,” 
(Washington DC, 17 November 1987): p. 431-633.
47 Brownell, Roy E., “Vice Presidential Secrecy: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Privilege 
and Historical Development,” St. John’s Law Review 84 (2010): p. 539-540.
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claim to secrecy for the minutes of meetings of a new energy task force in 
2001.48 The growth of Cheney’s power in early 2001 undermines the claim 
that Cheney’s exceptional responsibilities were due to the 9/11 attacks.
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Decision-Making on Iraq
While Cheney’s expertise in foreign policy, Bush’s decision to give him 
more power, and the expansion of executive powers in foreign policy after 
9/11 contributed to the scope of his influence, an under-explored element 
is Cheney’s relationship with other members of the Bush administration. In 
a review of the memoirs of Bush’s advisors in 2013, historian Melvyn Leffler 
argued that “None doubted that Bush was, in fact, the decision-maker.”49 
Cheney was a close advisor, but not the one calling the shots, at least most of 
the time, considering the order given on 11 September mentioned above.50 
Even if Bush ultimately made the final decisions in foreign policy or in 
national security, Cheney wielded considerable power on the Bush team. 
Cheney could not have done this alone, however, and was helped a great deal 
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Cheney was in charge of the transition in 2000, which meant that he had 
at least some influence over who was hired for key cabinet positions. Cheney 
interviewed in particular the candidates for Secretary of Defense along-
side Bush, and said Rumsfeld was appointed because he “outperformed the 
others in his interview.”51 He lauded in particular Rumsfeld’s experience and 
vision for the military.52 Shirley Anne Warshaw wrote that Cheney was really 
not directly in charge of hiring decisions, however, and that Andrew Card 
handled that part of the transition.53 It is clear, however, that Cheney was able 
to exert important influence over the choice of White House officials, due to 
his closeness to Bush. Rumsfeld, in his memoirs, seems to have had nothing 
but the highest respect for Cheney, saying that he “was uniquely influential 
as a vice president because he thought systematically, did his homework, and 
presented his ideas with skill, credibility, and timelines.”54
48 Montgomery,  Bruce  P., “Congressional Oversight: Vice President Richard  B.  Cheney’s 
Executive Branch Triumph,” Political Science Quarterly 120 (2005/2006): p. 582.
49 Leffler, Melvyn P., “The Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, 
History, Legacy,” Diplomatic History 37 (2013): p. 211.
50 Leffler: p. 211.
51 Cheney and Cheney: p. 299.
52 Cheney and Cheney: p. 299.
53 Warshaw, Shirley Anne, Guide to the White House Staff (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013): 
p. 186.
54 Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel Trade, 2012): p. 320.
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As the White House is a highly complicated organization, Cheney was 
able to use the bureaucratic dynamics to his own advantage, at least in Bush’s 
first term. James Pfiffner has argued that Cabinet secretaries have seen their 
power increasingly challenged by the large number of White House staff.55 
Cheney increased his own staff, which became very powerful, and at least 
partially duplicated the NSC, allowing the Vice President to create his own 
separate policymaking structure that shut out rival Cabinet members.56 The 
Vice President’s staff was present at every level of the policymaking process, 
monitoring and intervening in events.57 While the details of bureaucratic infi-
ghting in the Bush White House will not be known for many years, it is 
probable that Cheney used his extensive knowledge of that bureaucracy from 
his previous experience to maximize his power over the rest of the Cabinet.
It appears that Rumsfeld and Cheney were able to largely dominate White 
House decision-making on national security between 2001 and 2006. As is 
well known, for Iraq policy and counter-terrorism, Bush relied on a small 
group of advisors, which included Cheney, Rumsfeld, Cheney’s Chief of Staff 
Lewis  Libby, National Security Advisor Condoleeza  Rice, Secretary of State 
General Colin  Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul  Wolfowitz, and CIA 
Director George Tenet.58 Aside from Cheney and Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell 
were the most important members of the team for the decision to go to war in 
Iraq. Both were repeatedly attacked by Cheney and Rumsfeld so as to push their 
agenda through the White House decision-making process. That agenda was to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein, but to do it with as few troops as possible.59
Both Rumsfeld and Cheney believed that the attack on Iraq could be 
undertaken without the 500,000 soldiers believed necessary in the late 1990s 
for such a campaign. The Afghanistan War validated the theories of the 
Vice President and Secretary of Defense that the combination of precision-
guided weapons and networked warfare, the so-called “Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA),” eliminated the need for large numbers of ground troops. 
Powell, a retired general, was against the plan, and skeptical of the purported 
successes of the RMA model in Afghanistan, but he was overruled.60 One of 
55 Pfiffner, James, “Cabinet Secretaries versus the White House Staff,” Brookings, 12 Mar. 2015.
56 Baumgartner: p. 163.
57 Halperin, Morton H., Clapp, Priscilla A., and Kanter, Arnold, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, 2nd  ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006): p.  113. The tactic was also 
recommended by Elliot Abrams, a close advisor to President Bush. Abrams, Elliot, “The Prince 
of the White House,” Foreign Policy, 12 Mar. 2013.
58 Haney,  Patrick  J., “Foreign-Policy Advising: Models and Mysteries from the Bush 
Administration,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (2005): p. 289-302.
59 Leffler: p. 205, 209-210.
60 Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E., Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2006). For a military analysis of the problem, 
see Andres, Richard B., “The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq,” War in Iraq: Planning and 
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the reasons for why Cheney and Rumsfeld were able to get their way on this 
question was that President Bush agreed with their point of view on Iraq and 
military strategy.61 The lack of sufficient forces in Iraq at the outset of the war 
is seen by many analysts as one of the main reasons that the US was unable to 
defeat the subsequent insurgency.62
An even more controversial part of the decision to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein was the supposed link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. It appears 
that Cheney and Rumsfeld were key players in pushing the idea that Saddam 
was linked to the 9/11 attacks. Cheney still believed this in 2011, writing 
in his memoirs: “When we looked around the world in those first months 
after 9/11, there was no place more likely to be a nexus between terrorism 
and WMD capability than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”63 Wolfowitz also believed 
that it was true.64 In 2004, Chaim Kaufmann said that Cheney was the one 
primarily responsible for “threat inflation” in the run-up to the Iraq War, 
in essence, making the threat from Iraq seem much greater than it actually 
was. He pressured other government agencies, including the CIA, to present 
intelligence in a way that favored his case for war.65 Cheney’s neoconservative 
worldview included a fundamental belief that the strategies of deterrence and 
containment were ineffective, despite the lessons of the Cold War, and that 
threats such as Al Qaeda had to be engaged directly.66 
Cheney focused on blocking his main adversaries in the White House, 
including National Security Advisor Rice. The National Security Advisor is 
at least in theory the main advisor for national security policy, but is not 
an office that exists in the constitution. A number of previous National 
Security  Advisors had been powerful players in the government, especially 
Kissinger. President Bush liked and respected Rice, but Cheney, Rumsfeld, 
and Powell did not attempt to work closely with her on many issues, including 
on Iraq.67 As for Powell, both Rumsfeld and Cheney worked to undermine 
Execution, Mahnken (ed.), Thomas G. and Keaney, Thomas A. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007): 
p. 52-68.
61 Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E., The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for 
Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Random House, 2012): p. 5-14. See 
also Metz, Steven and Martin, John R., Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing 
Saddam  Hussein by Force (Carlisle  Barracks, PA:US Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, February 2010): p. 7-8.
62 Bensahel, Nora “Mission not accomplished,” War in Iraq: Planning and Execution, Mahnken 
and Keaney (ed.) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007): p. 138.
63 Cheney and Cheney: p. 368.
64 Leffler: p. 201.
65 Kaufmann, Chaim, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling 
of the Iraq War,” International Security, 29 (2004): p. 20, 37, 39.
66 Metz and Martin, Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein:p. 22.
67 Daalder, Ivo H. and Destler, I.M., “In the Shadows of the Oval Office: The Next National 
Security Advisor,” Foreign Affairs 88 (2009): p. 125-126.
141When the second becomes number one
the power of the State Department in favor of Defense, and Powell sometimes 
only found out about Cheney’s decisions regarding national security on the 
news.68 When Powell contradicted Cheney on bringing weapons inspectors 
back to Iraq in 2002, he was accused of “disloyalty” to the President, indica-
ting the extent to which Cheney directly represented Bush’s interests.69
As Cheney worked on dominating White House policymaking, Rumsfeld 
stifled opposition from certain parts of the US military regarding Iraq policy. 
Rumsfeld’s direct and aggressive control of the military establishment was at 
least one of the reasons leading to his resignation in 2006 after the so-called 
“revolt of the generals.”70 As cited by James Pfiffner, Powell’s Chief of Staff 
James  Wilkerson called the relationship between Rumsfeld and Cheney a 
“cabal” in which they made all major national security decisions.71
A Decline in Vice-Presidential Power? After Rumsfeld
Cheney’s power was at its zenith with the decision to invade Iraq, and 
he supported initiatives for enhanced interrogation techniques and military 
tribunals for prisoners associated with terrorist groups. It must be noted that 
Cheney was not the only one in favor of these measures, as Rice, Rumsfeld, 
Powell, Tenet and Attorney General John Ashcroft also approved.72 The debate 
over enhanced interrogation resurfaced at the end of 2014, with the release of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on CIA interrogation techniques. 
The report cites Cheney a number of times and indicates that he was briefed 
extensively about the CIA’s interrogation program.73 While the report does 
not indicate who made decisions about the program, statements include that 
“on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a select group of National 
Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking policy 
reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program.”74 Cheney subsequently 
claimed that the Senate Report was “deeply flawed,” and said that President 
Bush knew all about the CIA interrogation program.75
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There were setbacks, however, starting in summer 2003. The Valerie Plame 
affair, where the identity of a CIA agent was leaked to the press in retalia-
tion for an attack in the newspaper on the administration by her husband, 
embarrassed Cheney’s office. His top aide, Libby, eventually took the fall for 
the affair, but Cheney in his memoirs blamed Richard Armitage, the Deputy 
Secretary of State.76 While the details remain unclear, what is probable is that 
Cheney’s accusation of Armitage indicated a continued desire to undermine 
the power of the State Department in favor of Defense.
Another, more pressing problem for Cheney was the problems in the Iraq 
War. Cheney says in his memoirs that Rumsfeld attempted to resign over 
torture at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004, but that Bush stopped him, saying he 
could not resign during the war.77 In November 2006, however, with midterm 
elections looming amid the disaster in Iraq, Rumsfeld became a liability for 
the White House, and President Bush asked him to resign.78 Bob Woodward 
goes fairly easy on Rumsfeld, whereas other analysts say that his treatment of 
the armed forces and senior officers had become untenable.79 Stephen Metz 
stated that Bush fired Rumsfeld so as to attribute the blame to his Secretary of 
Defense for the failed strategy in Iraq.80 
Rumsfeld’s departure appears to have isolated Cheney a great deal in the 
Bush Administration. Much of the analysis claiming Cheney was in charge of 
the country appeared during this period, but it was really when his influence 
was declining. His reputation as a Republican hardliner hampered the Vice 
President’s ability to make policy after the GOP setback in the 2006 elec-
tions.81 Rice also gained more power than before in national security, and 
Bush appears to have started to listen more to the State Department.82 Rather 
than a direct reaction against Cheney, his loss of power and influence appears 
to have had a great deal to do with sanctioning Rumsfeld’s policies, which 
indicates that many in the administration believed that Rumsfeld had done 
considerable damage. Rumsfeld’s departure was of course not the only reason, 
and Jody Baumgartner has recently argued that Cheney’s decrease in influence 
in the second term was largely due to his unpopularity with the public.83
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Cheney, despite his association with Rumsfeld and the failures of the 
Iraq War, retained some influence, as Bob Woodward points out that senior 
generals used Cheney as a conduit to contact Bush outside of the chain of 
command for proposals for sending more soldiers to Iraq in the 2007 Surge.84 
While it remains difficult to identify clearly Cheney’s role in the Surge decision, 
he was in direct contact with military officers in the discussions over sending 
more troops, which indicates a close relationship, and more generally, support 
from the military.85 Cheney was in favor of the Surge strategy, and made an 
effort to support General Jack Keane’s (the strategy’s foremost advocate) ideas 
with President Bush.86 Metz and Martin indicate that Cheney “likely played 
a major role,” but would never have gone against any of the President’s deci-
sions regarding Iraq.87
Cheney’s relationship with the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 
was much less close than that with Rumsfeld. Gates was generally praised for 
having improved civil-military relations after the problems between Rumsfeld 
and the senior officers during 2005 and 2006.88 Gates had a good deal of respect 
for Cheney, as did Rumsfeld, but did not have the close working relationship 
developed over years. He claims that the torture issue and Guantanamo led 
Cheney to become more “isolated within the senior ranks of the administra-
tion,” but that he was very calm, and not the “Darth Vader” of his reputa-
tion.89 Gates does indicate, however, that he blocked Cheney’s agenda for a 
military confrontation with Iran.90 Without going into why, Gates makes an 
interesting comment at the end of his memoirs, saying that “By early 2007, 
Vice President Cheney was the outlier on the team, with Bush, Rice, Hadley 
[Steven Hadley, the National Security Advisor], and me in broad agreement 
on virtually all important issues.”91 
Conclusion
Cheney’s isolation and loss of influence after 2006 merits further research 
as more source material becomes available. It is probable that the departure of 
Rumsfeld as well as the continued impopularity after Iraq had a good deal to 
do with Cheney’s decline, but the extent of that decline and its nature remains 
unclear.
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Cheney was the most powerful Vice President in American history. While 
he may not have been the leader of the country, he had substantial influence 
with Bush and over national security policy in general. He was able to bolster 
this power both through a powerful staff that created a new power struc-
ture in the White House and through his alliance with his one-time mentor 
Donald  Rumsfeld. This association allowed the two men to dominate the 
policy-making process by marginalizing their less powerful colleagues on the 
Bush foreign policy team. Bush also appears to have given his approval to this 
arrangement, delegating powers to his sidekick that often made Cheney the 
number one power in foreign and defense policy. 
Can Cheney’s model be replicated? Gates told Joe Biden to follow Cheney’s 
model as Obama’s Vice President, and Biden certainly had the political expe-
rience and foreign policy experience to do so.92 Biden is viewed often by the 
media as largely ineffectual, but a number of analytical articles about his rela-
tionship with Obama and his power in the administration indicate otherwise. 
Biden is taken more seriously than commonly believed.93 Despite certain 
military officers’ open dislike of Biden, he played an important role during 
the decision to surge more soldiers to Afghanistan in 2009.94 When General 
Stanley McChrystal’s staff publicly insulted Biden in a Rolling Stone article in 
2010, Obama removed the general, who was the commander of US forces in 
Afghanistan.95 Biden is clearly seen as less of a formidable power than Cheney, 
however. More research remains to be done on comparing the performance of 
Cheney and Biden to show how the Vice Presidency has evolved to become 
the most important sidekick of the President over the last fifteen years.
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Abstract
Richard Cheney was the most powerful Vice President in American history. His influence 
was primarily concentrated in the arena of national security policy. This article examines 
how Cheney was able to marshal unprecedented influence in the context of both the greater 
increase in vice presidential power since 1945 and the decision-making structure of the Bush 
Administration. A largely unexplored reason for Cheney’s influence was his close working 
relationship with Secretary of Defense Donald  Rumsfeld, which allowed the two men to 
dominate the White House policymaking team on Iraq and counterterrorism policy.
Keywords
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States foreign policy, United States defense policy.
Résumé
Richard Cheney est le vice-président le plus puissant dans l’histoire américaine, et a exercé une 
emprise toute particulière sur la sécurité nationale. Cet article examine comment Cheney a pu 
prendre une telle influence, dans le contexte d’une évolution du pouvoir des vice-présidents 
depuis 1945 ainsi que de la structure décisionnelle de l’administration Bush. L’influence 
majeure de Cheney sur la politique américaine tient également à sa relation avec le secrétaire 
de Défense Donald Rumsfeld. Ce partenariat a permis aux deux hommes de dominer l’équipe 
de la Maison Blanche en pesant sur les décisions relatives à la guerre en Irak et à la guerre 
contre le terrorisme.
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